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Abstract 
This paper looks at the use of asymmetric tariffs as a regulatory instrument. We use a 
monopolistic market setup with two markets and we introduce price controls in one of 
the two. The purpose of the regulator is to maximise consumer welfare through this 
price discriminatory practice. We consider cases where the welfare of the consumers 
in the two markets is weighted equally and cases where it is not. In some cases we 
allow for the two markets to be linked through a monopsonistic input market. The 
paper focuses on the welfare implications of this regulatory approach, with the firm 
operating under a profit restriction. Results suggest that having only one price-
controlled market is in certain cases a good option from a welfare perspective. 
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1. Motivation  
 
The motivation behind this paper is to shed some light on, and to help understand, the 
mechanisms of asymmetric regulation. Policy makers are faced with questions of how 
and to what extent to regulate markets. The dilemma is to balance the increased levels 
of control offered by stronger and tighter regulation against the outcomes that result 
when markets are allowed to operate based on their own devices. Relying on market 
operation allows profit-maximising firms to address the challenges in the business 
environment either using a long or short-term perspective, which can have 
advantages, since they have the opportunity to base their decision-making on their 
knowledge of the market and cost structures. Additionally, if the firm is properly 
incentivised to act in a way that serves its profit-maximizing interests, then 
enforcement of regulation may be less expensive and less complicated. 
 
This paper addresses the issue of asymmetric regulation. In a simple model where a 
monopolistic/monopsonistic firm purchases in one wholesale market and sells in two 
retail markets, we examine the outcomes when one of the retail markets operates 
under price controls, whereas the other faces no regulation. An important restriction 
assumed for both markets is that the firm bears an obligation to meet the market 
demand in the controlled market, meaning that quantity rationing is not allowed in 
that market. The asymmetric regulatory approach (where consumers face price-
discriminatory tariffs) presented in this paper could be a realistic and sensible option 
with real-world applications if we consider the possibility of it’s being adopted : 
where there is lack of knowledge about costs; where there is not enough political will 
to introduce full tariffs; and where social policies targeted on specific populations are 
introduced. 
 
In this paper we assume that the aim of the regulator is to maximize consumer welfare 
subject to constraints. We focus specifically on the case where there is discriminatory 
tariff setting. By separating markets in price-controlled and non-price-controlled ones, 
the regulator can engage in activities that result in indirect income redistribution, as an 
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implied cross-subsidization probably takes place between the markets. In our paper 
these markets are modelled using two markets. Market 1 is a price-controlled market 
which can represent a market serving vulnerable consumers needing protection from 
high prices, and Market 2 is a non-price-controlled market which can represent a 
market serving the remainder of the market.  
 
An important element of our model is that it allows us to consider the possibility that 
the two markets are not only served by the one firm but they are also inter-connected 
through their input prices. This is because the output sold to each market is supplied 
using input purchased in one common wholesale market. With ascending wholesale 
input prices, the two retail markets are interrelated as larger activity in one of them 
increases costs for the other one. 
 
The model presented in this paper and the understandings that it provides are 
applicable in cases such as tariff-setting for transportation services (regulated as 
against unregulated fares), price capped finance costs for mortgages for certain 
groups, such as first time buyers) and control of energy prices for certain users. In 
these cases, asymmetric or partial tariffs can be set to serve income redistributing 
purposes through price discrimination driven by consumer welfare concerns for 
protected customer groups.  
 
Regulation is a very popular topic in the economics literature (Bradley and Price, 
1988; Vogelsang, 2002; Dobbs, 2004; Stigler and Friedland, 1962; Laffont and Tirole, 
1986; Averch and Johnson, 1962; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Newbery, 2002). Price-
cap regulation is a well-known and widely used instrument of regulation which has 
been examined previously in the literature (Cowan, 2002; Parker, 1997; Braeutigam 
and Panzar, 1993).This paper takes the approach of the regulator into account and 
therefore the latter sections examine consumer welfare, aiming to appreciate impacts 
of regulation for society as a whole. The effect of regulation on consumer welfare has 
been examined in papers in the published literature (Clemenz, 1991; Kang et al., 
2000; Sappington and Sibley, 1992; Eaton and Grossman, 1986). 
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Section 2 outlines the model with no regulation. Section 3 introduces a tariff in a 
unified retail market and discusses interventions that optimize the subsequent welfare 
impact. Section 4 discusses the introduction of differential tariffs in the two separate 
retail markets, first where unit wholesale prices are fixed and then where they rise as 
total output rises. Section 5 is the conclusion.  
 
2. The basic model with no regulation 
 
 In order to ease the analysis, a number of simplifying assumptions are made. The 
monopoly electricity supplier faces two identical markets, each characterized by the 
linear inverse demand function: 
(1)     1, 2i ip a bq i    
where pi and qi are the prices and quantities in market i, and a and b are parameters 
which take positive values. For heuristic reasons, that the two markets are initially 
assumed to be identical, so that the values of a and b do not vary across the two 
markets. The value taken by the parameter a is the maximum price that the 
monopolist can charge in either market and have non-negative sales. Therefore in all 
the analysis the tariff is never set above a. The parameter b is the (negative) slope of 
the inverse demand curve. The firm’s total cost, CT, is made up of a fixed cost, ī, and 
the cost of purchasing electricity in the wholesale market, in which it acts as a 
monopsonist. The wholesale price of electricity, Wp , is again assumed to be a linear 
function of total electricity supply, Tq  . This implies:   
(2)     T W TC p q *   
where 
(3)     W Tp c dq   
and 
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(4)     1 2T i
i
q q q q  ¦  
Again c and d are parameters which take positive values; c is the minimum price in 
the wholesale market that would generate a non-negative supply and d is the slope of 
the wholesale electricity supply curve. We assume that both c and d are non-negative. 
Where d is zero, there is a constant wholesale price for electricity equal to c.  
 
Before the introduction of any price caps, the first order conditions for profit 
maximization for the monopolist supplier is to set marginal revenue equal to marginal 
cost in each market. Using equation (1), marginal revenue in market i (MRi) is given 
as: 
(5)    ( ) 2i ii i
i
d p qMR a bq
dq
    
From the standard monopolistic argument, i ip MR! . The linear marginal revenue 
curve has the familiar characteristic that it meets the price axis at the same point as the 
demand curve, but has a negative slope that is twice as steep. 
 
Using equations (2), (3) and (4), the marginal cost in market i (MCi) is derived as: 
(6)    2Ti T T
T i
qdCMC MC c dq
dq q
w   w  
Equation (6) is important for three reasons. First, the marginal cost is above the 
average variable cost, reflecting the monopsonistic position of the single buyer. As a 
result, again the marginal cost curve cuts the price axis at the same point as the 
wholesale electricity supply curve but is twice as steep. Second, the marginal cost is 
the same in each market. Third, the level of the marginal cost is dependent on the total 
supply of electricity. This implies that the marginal cost in one market is dependent 
on the output levels in both markets. For subsequent analysis this means that the 
marginal cost in market 2 is a function of the output in market 1 and vice versa. 
Through this link interventions in one market affect activity in the second.  
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In the case with no regulation, each market faces the same marginal cost and has an 
identical marginal revenue curve. Using equations (5) and (6), this implies that the 
unconstrained profit-maximizing outputs in markets one and two are given as: 
(7)    
1, 2
2( 2 )
U
i
a cq i
b d
  
 
These quantities are positive as long as production is financially viable at all (that is 
as long as a > c). The corresponding prices in the individual markets can be obtained 
from substituting equation (7) into equation (1). This gives: 
 
(8)   
4
2( 2 )
U
i
ad ab bcp
b d
  
 
 
The general expression for total profits for the company takes the form 
(9)   
T i i W T
i
p q p q3   *¦
 
where the T subscripts represents the firm total summing activity in both retail 
markets. In the specific unconstrained case, substituting equations (3), (7) and (8) into 
equation (9) produces, with some manipulation: 
  
(10)                                   
2( )
2( 2 )
U
T
a c
b d
3  *  
 
In the short run production is profitable as long as a > c. In the long-run revenue 
earned needs to be enough to cover the fixed costs ī in order that non-negative profits 
can be made. Each market makes half of the revenue, so that the short-run profits 
made in each market, Ui3 , can be identified as: 
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(11)                                   
2( )
4( 2 )
U
i
a c
b d
3    
This gives the current profit in each market but does not allocate the fixed costs across 
markets.  
 
3. Introduction of a tariff in a single, unified market 
 
Primarily for pedagogic reasons, it is useful to begin by analyzing the impact of the 
introduction of a price tariff 1
Fp  in a single unified market and to trace the welfare 
implications. To be clear, in this case there is only one retail market which, for 
convenience, is identified as market 1. From equations (1), (2) and (3), we can 
determine the output and cost as linear functions of the price tariff. Applying equation 
(9) and setting the fixed cost, * , equal to zero gives profits as:  
(12)  
1 1
1 1 1 2
(( ) ( ))( )( )
F F
F F F
W
b d p ad bc a pp p q
b
   3    
 
where 1 12
1
( ) 2 2( )F F
F
d b a c ad b d p
dp b
3      and  
2
1
2 2
1
2( ) 0( )
F
F
d b d
d p b
3     
 
Where 1
Fp at , quantity demanded is zero, so that profits are therefore also zero for 
tariffs in this range. Similarly, where 1
F
Wp p , so that the market price equals average 
variable cost, again profits fall to zero. From equation (12), this tariff is ad bc
b d

 . 
Given that equation (12) is quadratic, the tariff level which maximizes the profits (and 
therefore also the price level which maximizes profits in a single unified market) is 
the mid-point of these two tariff values and is calculated as 1
2 ( )
2( )
F ad b a cp
b d
   , with 
a corresponding output of 1 2( )
F a cq
b d
  .   
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The full welfare implications of imposing the tariff can be analysed as three elements: 
the consumer surplus; the producer surplus to the competitive wholesale suppliers; 
and the profits to the retail monopolist/monopsonist. 
 
The consumer surplus ( 1FS ) can be derived, using equation (1), as: 
(13) 
2
1
1
( )
2
F
F a pS
b
  
where: 
(14) 
2
1 1 1
2
1 1
( ) 10, 0( )
F F F
F F
dS a p d S
dp b d p b
    !  
Similarly, from equations (1), (3) and (4) the producer surplus in the wholesale 
market equals: 
(15) 
2
1
1 2
( )
2
F
F d a pP
b
 
 
so that 
(16) 1 12
1
( ) 0
F F
F
dP d a p
dp b
    
Equation (12) gives the profits to the retailer, with  
(17) 1 12
1
2 ( ) 2( )F F
F
d ad b a c b d p
dp b
3      
If weights ,S PZ Z and Z3 are attached to the consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
profits, the change in welfare as the tariff changes is given as:    
(18) 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
F F F F
S PF F F F
dW dS dP d
dp dp dp dp
Z Z Z3 3    
Substituting expressions (14), (16) and (17) into equation (18) gives: 
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(19) 1 11 2
1
( )( ) (2 ( ) 2( ) )F FF P S
F
d b a p ad b a c b d pdW
dp b
Z Z Z3         where 
2
1
2 2
1
( ) 2 ( )
( )
F
P S
F
d b b dd W
d p b
Z Z Z3   . 
Applying the first and second order conditions implies that welfare is maximized 
where the tariff is set at the optimal level, indicated by a star superscript 
(20) 
*
1
(2 ( ) ( )
2 ( )
F P S
P S
ad b a c a d bp
b d d b
Z Z Z
Z Z Z
3
3
         
as long as the second order conditions hold, that is: 
(21) 
2( )
P Sd b
b d
Z ZZ3 !  .  
 
Expression (21) illustrates an important problem for the analysis. A reduction in the 
tariff will always increase the producer and consumer surplus. But where 1
Fp  is less 
than the profit maximising level, a reduction in the tariff will reduce profits. If the 
welfare weight on profits is so low that expression (21) does not hold, the first order 
condition is a welfare minimum and welfare will be increased without limit as the 
tariff falls. Similarly, if  
(22) 
( )
2 ( ) 2( )
P S P Sa d b d b
ad a c b d
Z Z Z ZZ3 ! !   .  
then although there is a determinate welfare maximizing price tariff, it is negative.   
 
The sensitivity of the welfare optimal tariff to the weights gives: 
(23) 
*
1
2
( ) 0(2 ( ) )
F
P P S
p bd a c
b d d b
Z
Z Z Z Z
3
3
w   w      
(24) 
* 2
1
2
( ) 0(2 ( ) )
F
S P S
p b a c
b d d b
Z
Z Z Z Z
3
3
w   w      
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Equations (23) and (24) imply that the greater the weight on consumer surplus and the 
producer surplus in the wholesale market, the lower the welfare maximising tariff. 
 
Some special cases produce familiar results. Maximising welfare where , 0S PZ Z  , 
so that no concern is paid to the welfare of consumers or wholesale producers,  
generates a tariff set at the profit maximizing price discussed in Section 3: 
(25) 
*
1
2 ( )
2( )
F ad b a cp
b d
     
When 0PZ   and SZ Z3 , the welfare maximizing point is set where the marginal 
cost curve for the monopsonistic retailer cuts the demand curve, so that 
(26) 
*
1
2
2
F ad bcp
b d
   . 
Alternatively, if 0SZ  , the welfare maximizing point is where the marginal revenue 
curve cuts the wholesale supply curve, so that:  
(27) 
*
1 2
F ab ad bcp
b d
    . 
Finally, if the welfare of all actors is weighted equally, so that , , 1S PZ Z Z3  , the 
welfare maximizing tariff is the competitive price, where the consumer demand curve 
cuts the wholesale competitive supply curve, so that:  
(28) 
*
1
F ad bcp
b d
   . 
At this point retail profits are zero. 
 
This implies that in a unified market, if the welfare of consumers and wholesale 
(competitive) producers are weighted higher than the welfare of the monopolist, then 
the welfare optimizing price tariff leaves the monopolist making a loss. This raises the 
question of how this is sustained. How does the government force the profit 
maximizing firm to maintain production? This is another aspect of the issues raised in 
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the discussion around expressions (21) and (22). In the analysis in subsequent 
sections, we therefore take the non-negative profits as a constraint in order to maintain 
the continuing existence of the firm. Also for pedagogic reasons we also typically 
give zero weight to the producer surplus in the wholesale market. 
 
Although the aim of this section is mainly introductory, where tariffs are introduced in 
one market but the firm sells in two, there are conditions under which output in the 
second market falls to zero. The second market collapses. This is a topic we consider 
in greater detail later in the paper. When this occurs and only the controlled market 
remains operative, under subsequent reductions in the tariff rate, equations outlined in 
the section above will apply to the remaining single controlled market.  
 
4. Impact of separate tariffs in each of the two markets 
 
Where there are two retail markets, markets 1 and 2, the regulator can discriminate 
and differentiate the tariffs set in each. In general it will prove useful to define all the 
relevant variables as functions of the two price tariffs and the demand and cost 
parameters. We begin with the consumer surplus. Using equation (13) and defining 
the total consumer welfare, FTS , as the weighted sum of the consumer surplus in 
markets 1 and 2, for values of 1 2,
F Fp p ad :  
 (29) 
2
1,2 1,2
1 ( )
2
F i F i F
T S i S i
i i
S S a p
b
Z Z
  
  ¦ ¦  
where: 
( ) 0
i FF
S iT
F
i
a pS
p b
Z w  dw  
and iSZ is the weight put on the consumer surplus in market i. 
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The consumer’s welfare is minimized at the value zero where 1 2,
F Fp p a . Where the 
consumer’s welfare is fixed at some positive level, FTS , equation (29) can be 
interpreted as the associated iso-consumer welfare function, which for convenience, 
we refer to subsequently as the iso-welfare function. Diagrammatically, these 
functions take the form of segments of an ellipse which is centred on point A in
1 2,
F Fp p
 space. Point A has co-ordinates (a,a) and the segments are values where
1 2,
F Fp p ad . One of the iso-welfare curves (where 1 2 1S SZ Z  ) is shown as W in 
Figure 1. In general the slope of the iso-consumer’s welfare function is given as: 
(30)
2
21 2
1
2 1 1
( )/
/ ( )
FF F F
ST
F F F F
T S
a pdp S p
dp S p a p
Z
Z
 w w  w w 
 
Broadly, the lower are the values of the tariffs below a, the higher the level of 
consumer welfare. For all iso-welfare functions, where 1
Fp a , the function is 
vertical and  where 2
Fp a 
 it is horizontal.   
 
Where the weights for each market are equal, the iso-welfare functions are segments 
of circles, as shown in Figure 1. This is illustrated by W and, from equation (30), all 
iso-welfare functions where the consumer surplus in each market is weighted equally 
have a slope equal to -1 where 1 2
F Fp p . If the consumer’s surplus in market 1 is 
weighted more heavily than in market 2, the iso-consumer’s welfare functions have a 
shape similar to W1 and W2 in Figure 2. Whilst the curves will still be vertical and 
horizontal where the relevant prices take their maximum value, a, the slope where
1 2
F Fp p 
 now has a lower absolute value equal to 2 1/S SZ Z .    
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Adapting equation (15) to the case where there are two retail markets, the producer 
surplus, FTP is given as 
(31) 
2
1 2
2
(2 )
2
F F
F
T
d a p pP
b
  
 
so that 
(32) 1 22
(2 ) 0
F F F
T
F
i
P d a p p
p b
w    w  
Any increase in price in either retail market reduces total output and therefore reduces 
producer surplus and at point A, where 1 2
F Fp p a  , the producer surplus is zero, 
given that output is zero. The slope of the iso-producer surplus lines is given as:  
(33) 1 2
2 1
/ 1
/
F F F
T
F F F
T
p P p
p P p
w w w   w w w  
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The subsequent iso-producer surplus functions are therefore negative 45 degree 
straight lines, where further to the SW of point A, the higher the producer surplus. 
 
Finally, to calculate the monopolist/monopsonist’s profit, output in each market is 
determined by equation (1), average wholesale price by equation (2) and the 
monopolist’s profits by equation (9), where in each case a tariff is imposed as the 
price. 
(34)
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 2
( (2 ))( ) ( (2 ))( )F F F F F F F FF
T
bp bc d a p p a p bp bc d a p p a p
b b
         3    
which gives 
(35)
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2
2 ( (2 ( ))) ( (2 ( )))( ) (( ) ( ) )F F F F F F F FF
T
a bc d a p p bc ab d a p p p p b p p
b b b
         3   
 
This implies that 
(36) 
2
1 2
2 2 2
4 2 ( ) 2 2( )
, 0( )
F F FF F
iT T
F F
i i
ad bc ab d p p bp d b
p b p b
    w3 w 3    w w  
Using expression (36), the first and second order conditions imply that profits are 
maximized where: 
(37) 1 2
4
2 4
F F ad bc abp p
b d
     
This set of tariffs equal the unconstrained monopoly prices where there are two retail 
markets.  
 
Iso-profit curves for the firm are the locus of values for 1
Fp  and 2
Fp which produce a 
constant profit for the firm. These are implied by equation (35). In general, this takes 
the form of an elipse. Initially the no-fixed-cost zero-profit iso-profit case is taken as a 
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benchmark. Where the markets are treated identically, so that the price tariff is the 
same in both, zero profits occur where:  1 2,p p a or 22
bc ad
b d

 . Where both prices 
equal a, there is zero demand, therefore zero profits. Again note that a is an effective 
upper bound for the price tariff, as higher values imply negative demand. Where the 
two tariffs take the lower value, 2
2
bc ad
b d

 , which is subsequently denoted as z, the 
tariff is set at the wholesale price. Note that with identical markets and tariffs set in 
both markets, their identical profit maximizing value will be denoted as k, the mean 
value between the two zero profit values. 
 
4.1  The introduction of tariffs where the wholesale price is constant (d = 0)  
 
It is useful to initially take the special case where the wholesale price is fixed at the 
level c and is invariant to the output level so that d = 0. From equation (35) the total 
profits are now given as: 
(38) 1 1 2 2( )( ) ( )( )
F F F F
F
T
p c a p p c a p
b b
   3    
Equation (38) can be reformulated as: 
(39) 
2 2 2
1 2
( )
2 2 2
F F F
T
a c a c a cp p bª  º ª  º ª º ª º     3« » « »« » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¬ ¼ ¬ ¼  
This is the equation for the iso-profit curve where profits equal FT3 . In this special 
case it represents a circle whose center is  
2
a c
and whose radius, r, is 
2( )
2
F
T
a c b  3 . 
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 Imposing equal tariffs, the lowest value on the zero iso-profit curve, which we call 
more generally z, is equal to c and from equation (37) the profit maximizing prices 
are:  
(40) 1 2 2
F F a cp p    
Figure 1 shows the zero iso-profit curve in this case. Given the constraint that output 
cannot take negative values. The zero iso-profit curve therefore comprises an isolated 
point, A, and the arc BZC. At points A and Z, the tariffs in both markets take the 
value a and z respectively. In this case the segment BZC comprises one half of a 
circle whose center is the profit maximizing tariffs (k,k). This zero iso-profit curve 
goes through the points (c,c), (c,a) and (a,c) and has D UDGLXV HTXDO WR ¥I ZKHUH
2
a cf  so that the radius can also be expressed as 
2
a c
. 
 
One key element of the analysis is the locus of tariff values where the iso-profit 
curves are horizontal or vertical. These points identify the profit-maximising price in 
one market, given a specific tariff in the second market. However, a second 
interpretation is that these points show the minimum values of each tariff that will 
support a given profit level. The minimum level of 1p is shown where the iso-profit 
curve is horizontal, the minimum level of 2p where it is vertical.  
 
The general slope of the iso-profit curve, not restricted to the case where d = 0, is 
given as: 
(41) 1 2 1 2 2
2 1 1 2 1
/ 4 2 ( ) 2
/ 4 2 ( ) 2
F F F F F F
T
F F F F F F
T
dp p ad bc ab d p p bp
dp p ad bc ab d p p bp
w3 w       w3 w       
Where the tariffs are equal in both markets, the iso-profit curve will have a -45% 
slope. This reflects the symmetry in the model. It implies that the impact on profits of 
a change in the either price would be just offset by an equal and opposite change in 
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the other price. The iso-profit curve is horizontal where 1 2/
P Pdp dp = 0. From equation 
(41) this requires that 2/ 0F FT pw3 w  which occurs where 
 (42) 1 2 24 2 ( ) 2 0.F F Fad bc ab d p p bp        
Rearranging equation (42) produces the profit-maximising value of 2Pp , given a tariff 
1
Pp .  
(43) 2 1
4
2( )
F Fad bc ab dp p
b d b d
      
Equation (43) can be seen as a reaction function: it is the price set in the unregulated 
market 2, 2
Pp , that will be the best response to the regulator setting a specific tariff, 
1
Pp , in market 1. In the special case where d = 0, this reaction function reduces to
2 2
F a cp  . This simply means that if a tariff is set in market 1, the profit maximizing 
tariff in market 2 is the initial monopoly price and that as the tariff in market 1 falls, 
the maximum profit price for market 2 remains fixed at 
2
a c
. This is represented by 
the vertical line FKE in Figure 1. 
 
With no discretionary weights (that is, setting all weights to unity) the first order 
conditions for maximizing welfare are that: 
(44) 0
F F F F
i i T T
iF F F F
i i i i
W S P
p p p p
w w w w3    w w w w  
In this case, using equations (29) and (36) and noting that setting d =0 implies that the 
producer surplus is zero, equation (44) can be expressed as:  
(45) 
( ) ( )( ) 0
F FF F
i ii i
iF
i
a p p cW a p
p b b
ª º  w   ¬ ¼   w  
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which implies 1 2,
F Fp p c . In this case the welfare maximizing position is clear. The 
regulator should impose a tariff equal to c in each market and the welfare maximizing 
point is at Z. The monopolistic firm makes zero profits. 
 
Figure 1 shows that the zero iso-profit curve as the half circle, center K, which goes 
through Z. If the welfare of consumers in each market is given the same weight, the 
highest attainable consumer iso-welfare function, consistent with non-negative profits 
is the quarter circle, center A, which again passes through Z. This is the optimal 
position in this case. 
 
If the consumer welfare weights differ across the two retail markets, the optimal 
outcome is changed. Increasing the weight on market 1 shifts the consumer iso-
welfare function so that it is tangent to the zero iso-profit curve along the segment ZE. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2. The iso-welfare curve W1 that passes through point Z is 
no longer tangent to the zero iso-profit curve. The highest (weighted) consumer 
surplus is now found at point H on the iso-welfare curve W2.  
 
The most extreme case is where the welfare of consumers in market two is given zero 
weight by the regulator. In this case, the iso-welfare curves become straight horizontal 
lines, with lower lines producing higher consumer welfare. This would lead to an 
optimal outcome given by point E. The monopoly price is still charged in market 2 
and the profits generated in that market are wholly used to subsidise the consumers in 
market 1.  
 
The segment ZE in both Figures 1 and 2 might include a range where the tariff in 
market 1 is negative. Take, for example, the situation where there are no wholesale 
cost so that c = 0. In this case, all the points on the zero iso-profit line, apart from 
points A and Z, have one negative price tariff. In principle the existence of negative 
prices is not problematic (although negative output clearly is). Negative prices could 
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represent the firm paying subsidies to consumers in one market, rather than charging a 
positive price. 
 
 
 
4.1.1  A tariff in only one of the two markets, zero profit constraint 
 
This paper focusses on situations where there are restrictions on the extent to which 
the separate markets can be regulated and, in particular, the extreme case where tariffs 
can only be set in one market. A specific concern is the size of the loss in efficiency 
that such a constraint would imply, compared to the outcome where tariffs are 
optimally set in both markets. 
 
From equation (29), where consumers in each market are given a weight of 1, the iso- 
consumer surplus curve is given by the formula: 
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(46) 
2 2
1 2
1 ( ) ( )
2
F F F
TS a p a pb
ª º   ¬ ¼  
Expression (46) is the equation of a circle whose center is point A (remembering that 
this only operates for values of Fip ad ). If R is the radius of that circle, equation (46) 
can be replaced by:  
(47) 
2
2
F
T
RS
b
  
Using Pythagoras’s theorem, the iso-welfare function that passes through the point 
that maximizes the monopoly profit has a radius ¥I(recalling that we defined f, in 
the discussion following equation (40), as 
2
a c ). From equation (47) the associated 
consumer surplus is therefore
2f
b
. With optimal regulation, given the zero profit 
constraint, tariffs are set at Z. The radius of the iso-welfare function passing through 
that point LV ¥2f, so that the associated consumer surplus is 
24 f
b
. Moving to the 
optimal regulation improves consumer welfare, as measured by the consumer surplus, 
by 400%. However, if the regulator is restricted to setting a tariff in only one market, 
how does this affect the resulting welfare?  
 
With only one tariff in operation, consumer welfare is optimized at point E, and with 
equal consumer weights in each market the radius of the iso-welfare function that 
goes through this point is given as: 
(48) 2 2 2 2( 2 ) 2(2 2)R f f f f        
Substituting this result into equation (47) gives a consumers surplus of 
2(2 2) f
b

. 
This value, expressed as a ratio of the optimal welfare is 2 2 0.85
4
  . 
Alternatively, if the changes in welfare, rather than the absolute values, are compared 
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the ratio is  1 2 0.80
3
  .  Therefore although there is a loss in effectiveness in only 
being able to target one market, the increase in welfare is only reduced by 20% and 
the consumer surplus in the market not receiving the tariff is unchanged. 
 
Moreover, in the case where d = 0, if the regulator can decide which market to target, 
20% represents the maximum lost potential welfare. Where there is greater weight 
placed on the benefits to one set of consumers, the resulting loss in effectiveness, as 
against a situation where the same tariff is applied to both sets of consumers, will be 
lower. In fact we can use the analysis to find the relative weights that have to be 
placed on the consumer surplus in the two markets that would lead the regulator to 
actually prefer imposing a tariff in only one market, rather than the same tariff in 
both.  
 
Where the two markets are weighted unequally, the maximum consumer surplus 
where both tariffs are constrained to take the same value is 2 1 22 2f
b
Z Zª º« »¬ ¼ . Where the 
tariff can only apply in market 1, the maximum consumer surplus is 
2 1 2(3 2 2)
2
f
b
Z Zª º « »¬ ¼
. Therefore if the regulator is faced with this choice, the 
optimal decision would be to apply the tariff only in market 1 if: 
2 21 2 1 2 1
2
(3 2 2) 2 2 3 1.64
2 2 2 1
f f
b b
Z Z Z Z Z
Z
ª º  ª º! o !  « » « » ¬ ¼¬ ¼
. 
Therefore as long as consumer surplus in market 1 is weighted more than 64% greater 
than in market 2, it is better to place an optimal tariff only in market 1 than have to 
impose equal tariffs in both markets.  
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4.1.2  A tariff in only one of the two markets, positive profit constraint 
 
Up to now we have only considered the case where the constraint operates with zero 
profits+RZHYHULIIL[HGFRVWVDUHSRVLWLYHVRWKDWī!or if the company has some 
kind of power with which it can push back against the regulator, the profit constraint 
will be positive. 
 
 
The maximum, unregulated, profits, FMAX3 , are determined by substituting the value 
1 2, 2
F F a cp p    into equation (38). This gives the result:  
(49) 
2 22 2
2
F
MAX
a c f
b b
ª º3   « »¬ ¼  
Using equation (49), it is convenient to express the actual profit constraint, FT3 , as   
(50) 
22F F
T MAX
f
b
UU3  3   
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where 1 0Ut t . Substituting this into the expression associated with equation (38) 
for the radius of the iso-profit curve, r, gives the result that1  
(51) 2 22(1 ) 2(1 )r f r fU U  o   . 
Therefore if 0U   ZH KDYH WKH ]HUR SURILW FDVH ZKHUH U   ¥I ZKHUHDV 1U  
produces the profit maximizing case where r = 0. For values of S  between 1 and 0, 
the radius of the iso-SURILW OLQH OLHV EHWZHHQ  DQG ¥I  As the profit constraint 
increases the circular iso-profit curve moves closer to the profit-maximising point 
(k,k). Note that now the profit constraint no longer goes through point A (representing 
prices a,a). Also the point Z which minimizes prices in both markets, consistent with 
the profits constraint and price equality, now has prices greater than c.  
 
We can use equations (46) and (50) to calculate the new maximum welfare where 
there is a positive profit identified by U . The maximum value of R is now 
2 2(1 ) fUª º ¬ ¼ . The maximum consumer surplus, where consumers in both 
markets are given a weight of unity equals:  
(52) 
2 2 22 2(1 ) 2 2 (1 )
2
F
T
f f
S
b b
U U Uª º ª º    ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼   
where 
1
221 (1 )
0
F
T
f
S
b
U
U
ª º  « »w ¬ ¼ w .   
 
We can calculate the implication of introducing the tariff in only one market and 
imposing the profit constraint. Again if the tariff is imposed in market 1, the output in 
market 2 remains at the monopoly level and the excess profits in that market subsidise 
output in market 1. The maximum consumer surplus (both markets with a unitary 
weight) is now:  
                                                          
1
 Note that we use the upper-case, R, for the radius of the iso-welfare function and the lower case, r, for 
the iso-profit function. 
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(53) 
2 2 21 1 2(1 ) 2 2 (1 )
2
F
T
f f
S
b b
U U Uª ºª º   ª º  ¬ ¼« »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼   
With 
1
221 (2(1 ))
F
T
f
S
b
U
U
ª º  « »w ¬ ¼ w 6LPLODUO\ WKH UDWLRȍ, of the consumer welfare 
where one tariff is imposed, as against a common tariff in both markets, is: 
 (54) 2 2 (1 ) 1
2 2 (1 )
U U
U U
  :      . 
However, 0U
w: !w , so that this ratio gets higher, and approaches 1 as the value of U
approaches 1. That is to say, the proportionate loss in welfare in an optimal single 
market tariff, as against a common tariff in both markets falls as the profit constraint 
tightens.  
 
Where the profit constraint is positive, there is an increase in welfare where the 
weights for market 1 and 2 are such that:  
(55)
2 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
3 2 2 2 (1 )
2 2
2 2 (1 ) 2 2 (1 )
2 2
f f
b b
f f
b b
Z U U Z
Z U U Z U U
ª º  ¬ ¼  !
ª º ª º     ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
 
 which implies  1
2
1 2 (1 )
1 2( 2 1) (1 )
U UZ
Z U U
ª º  ¬ ¼! ª º   ¬ ¼
. 
This means that, for example, if U equals 0.5, then if 1
2
1.38ZZ ! , then it is better for 
the regulator to impose a tariff solely in market 1, rather than impose a common tariff 
in both markets. 
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This section essentially analyses the situation where the positive profits made in the 
unregulated retail market (market 2) are used to subsidise consumers in the regulated 
market. There is no detrimental impact on consumers in market 2. However, on the 
other hand, market 2 consumers receive no benefit from the regulation. In the next 
section, where we introduce a positively sloping wholesale supply curve, the analysis 
becomes more complex.   
 
4.2 The introduction of tariffs where the wholesale price increases with output 
 (d > 0) 
 
In the general case, where the wholesale cost rises as total output increases the iso-
profit curves are given by the expression (35). The adoption of a positive value for the 
wholesale supply parameter d has a number of important implications. Consider the 
zero iso-profit curve, and compare it to the circular curve, where d = 0, discussed in 
detail in Section 4.1. The new iso-profit curve, where d > 0, is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
-26- 
 
The zero iso-profit curve now has the form of an oval. The point A (a,a) is still on the 
curve but the point Z (z,z), where wholesale cost equals retail price, has moved 
further up the 45 degree line through the origin: that is to say, z > c. The 
unconstrained profit maximizing point, K (k,k), is still at the mid-point between A and 
Z. The zero iso-profit curve is symmetric around the two perpendicular axes that have 
negative and positive 45 degree slopes and pass through the point K. The width on the 
45 degree line through the origin, AZ, is now shorter than the distance along the other 
axis, FG. This is also verified by the fact that the points (z,a) and (a,z) are no longer 
on the zero iso-profit curve, but generate positive profits.  
 
From equation (43), if the tariff is imposed only in market 1, and the firm sets the 
profit maximizing price in market 2, the market prices lie on a line with a slope equal 
to
b d
d
 . This is shown as KE in Figure 4 for values of 1Fp kd . That is to say, if the 
tariff in market 1 falls by 1 unit, the profit maximizing price in market 2 will increase 
by 1d
b d
d . There is now a clearer trade-off between the consumers in the separate 
markets. A tariff imposed solely in market 1 in a previously unregulated system 
means that the consumer surplus in market 2 now falls as the consumer surplus in 
market 1 rises, 
 
One potential issue is whether the restriction that the price in market 2 cannot rise 
above the value a acts as a constraint in this case. Essentially this is asking the 
question: can the regulator set a tariff in market 1 such that the profit-maximising 
response would be to produce zero output in market 2, yet the firm would still be 
make positive profits?  
 
For this to occur implies the following dual restrictions. First, the tariff in market 1 
must be greater than the wholesale price for supplying the output of market 1. 
Simultaneously, the marginal wholesale cost at that output must be greater than a, and 
therefore greater than the highest marginal revenue in market 2. We proceed by 
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finding the highest tariff, *1
Fp , where this applies. This requires that the marginal 
wholesale cost just equals a, so that using equation (6): 
 (56) *12 Fa c dq   
This rearranges to 
(57) *1 2
F a cq
d
  
The tariff at which this occurs is given as: 
(58) * *1 1
2 ( )
2
F F ad b a cp a bq
d
     
This is therefore the highest tariff in market 1 at which the firm will voluntarily leave 
market 2. The key issue is whether the company is profitable at that tariff. This 
requires the tariff in market 1 to be greater than the wholesale price, *FWp . The 
wholesale price is given as: 
(59) * *1 2 2
F F
W
a c a cp c dq c        
Therefore, for profitability:  
(60) * *1
2 ( )
2 2
F
W
ad b a c a cp p d b
d
  t o t o t  
This is simply the condition that the absolute slope of the supply function is greater 
than the slope of the demand function. If this expression holds, the minimum price 
tariff **1
Fp consistent with zero profits and zero profit-maximising output in market 2 
would be where the tariff in market 1 just equals the wholesale price. This implies 
that: 
(61) 
*
** ** * 1
1 1
F
F F F
W
a p ad bcp p c dq c d
b b d
ª º       « » ¬ ¼
 
Therefore, where d bt , we can define a tariff range for market 1 where the profit 
maximising output for market 2 is zero. This range is given by:  
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 (62) 1
2 ( )
2
Fad b a c ad bcp
d b d
  t t   
If the tariff is set in this range, the analysis reverts to that outlined in Section 3. The 
firm will only operate in the regulated market.  
It is interesting to consider the special case where b = d. In this case the zero iso-profit 
is horizontal at E where it cuts the vertical line through A. This implies that the 
minimum price tariff in market 1 consistent with non-negative profits just leads to 
output in market 2 becoming unprofitable. This is illustrated in Figure 5. In this case 
the line KE is the line given in equation (43) where in this case the slope equals – 2. 
 
 
Using the expressions around equation (37), in this case the values of z and k are 
(2a+c)/3 and (5a +c)/6. It is useful to adopt the following notation: 
(63) 
6 3
a c fg    
This means that the distances AK, AZ and AE take the values ¥J, ¥J and 3g 
respectively. If the only concern is the consumer surplus with differential weighting 
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between markets, subject to a profit constraint, then it is straightforward to analyse 
this as in sub-section 4.1 where the wholesale price was fixed. Where there is no 
intervention, the outcome is at K and, using equation (47), the consumer surplus is 
g2/b. Where the tariff is introduced with the same value in both markets, the outcome 
is at z and the consumer surplus equals 4g2/d. As in the case where d = 0, introducing 
the uniform minimum tariff increases consumer surplus to 4 times its original value. 
However, if the minimum tariff is only imposed in one market, in this case the 
consumer surplus is given as 9g2/2b. This gives a higher value than either of the other 
options. Of course, this implies that if the consumer surplus in market 1 were given a 
greater weight than those in market 2, this would furnish an even stronger argument 
for favouring the introduction of a single tariff in only that market. 
 
We know that for d bt , then the zero profit outcome means setting price equal to the 
wholesale price in market 1. In that case the consumer surplus, 1
FS , is given as:  
(64) 
2
1 2
( )
2( )
F b a cS
b d
   
However, the consumer surplus where the tariff is introduced in both markets 
simultaneously, 2
FS , equals:  
(65) 
2
2 2
( )
( 2 )
F b a cS
b d
   
For 1 2
F FS St , then 
2
bd ! . But where market 2 is reduced to an output of zero, then 
2
bd bt ! , so that wherever this occurs, the choice between equal minimum tariffs 
in both markets and concentrating in just one market means that the consumer surplus 
would be maximised by just applying the tariff to one market. 2 
                                                          
2
 It also means that there is a range of values for d given by 
2
b d bd d where a greater consumer 
surplus would be generated, with a zero profit constraint, by setting a tariff in market equal to the 
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5. Conclusions 
 
It appears often to be the case that in markets with a degree of monopoly power, 
regulators wish to impose price controls in only part of. This is typically for 
redistributive reasons, with the welfare of one set of consumers weighted more 
heavily than others. In the case of the electricity market this could be motivated by 
concerns over fuel poverty. In this paper we formally analyse this behaviour using a 
very stylised model in which a monopolist serving two separate retail markets is a 
monopsonist in an otherwise competitive wholesale market. The paper focuses on the 
consumer welfare implications of imposing a price tariff in only one market, against 
having to impose a uniform tariff in both markets. 
 
The analytical results suggest that the welfare costs of imposing price constraints in 
only one market are relatively low, and this is especially the case where the benefits to 
the favoured market are weighted more heavily. Where the minimum profit constraint 
is increased, the relative welfare loss from price control only operating in one market 
is further reduced. Moreover, with a degree of scarcity in the wholesale market we get 
the potential for a counterintuitive result. This is that there are conditions where it is 
better to only control one tariff, rather than impose a uniform tariff in both markets, 
even with neutral consumer welfare weights. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
average wholesale price and a tariff higher than the marginal wholesale cost in the second market, ather 
than a common tariff in both markets. 
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